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of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Case No. 
-vs- 10722 
.JUHN' .Jl~NSEN, 
Defeudant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal From the Judgment of the 
Heventh District Court for Sanpete County 
Hon. Joseph G .• Jeppson, Judge 
L. E. MIDGLEY 
DON \'. TIBBS 
~>0 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Attorney for Respondent 
+15 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
STATEME~NT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
rrhis is an action for personal injuries and for prop-
t•l'ty darnag<:> arising out of an accident involving vehicles 
driv0n h~· the parties. 
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DISPOSITION IN Lff\VER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. The Court submitted 
a special verdict consisting of six "Propositions.'' After 
deliberating, the jury returned with ansvYers to the Pro-
positions, (see Addendum to this Brief, Page 17), the 
Court advised the jury that their answers were incon-
sistent and the jury was again instructed to retire for 
further deliberations. The jury thereafter returned with 
corrected answers, (see Verdict No. 2, Addendum, Page 
18). The Trial Court, after po0lling and questioning the 
jurors individually and at length, entered .Judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks an Order directing that 
Judgment be entered in favor of the Defendant, no cause 
for action, in accordance with the verdicts of the jury, 
or in the alternative, for a reversal of the Judgment and 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This law suit arose out of a vehicle collision on Sep-
tember 2, 1965 approximately one mile south of Chester, 
Utah on U 11, which is a hard-surfaced north-south 
hi1rhwav providin()' one lane of travel for either direction. b ,) b 
The day was clear, the roads dry, the accident occurred 
approximately 3 :30 p.m. (T-7) 
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Hoth parties were driving trucks southbound, the 
Plaintiff overtaking the Defendant. 
'L1he Defendant's pick-up truck was equipped with 
automatic turn signals with the left front signal on the 
top of the left front fender, and the rear signal in the 
nsnal place on the left rear of the truck. The Plaintiff 
t<•:-;tifi<>d that he did not see the turn signal and therefore 
starkd to pass the Defendant's vehicle when the Defen-
dant made a left turn directly into his path. Plaintiff 
then swerved right, applied brakes, and Jeft brake marks 
81 feet before impact ( T-88) and struck the right rear 
portion of the Defendant's vehicle, then·after upsetting 
off the west edge of the road. 
'l1lrn Plaintiff had not sounded his horn prior to at-
tempting to pass. ( T-81) 
The case was tried to a jury who were submitted 
t;peeial Interrogatories. 
After the jury had deliberated for some considerable 
time, the Court called the jury back into session (T-120-
1'-121); they had not reached a verdict and were again 
excused to return to the jury room for further deliber-
ation. 
After further considerable deliberations, the jury 
returned to the courtroom and announced that they had 
n~ached a verdict. ( T-122) 'rhe Special Interrogatories 
wert- answered, as indicated in Verdict No. 1, Addendum 
to this Brief, (T-122) which, as commented on later by 
the Court in the absence of the jury, resulted in a verdict 
for tht> Defondant, No Caust> for Action. However, the 
Court made the following state111Pnt to the jury: 
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" ( T-122) The Court: I think I should return 
the verdict to you and ask you to reconsider it. 
You have found on Proposition No. 2 that thti 
Defendant was negligent in not giving an adequate 
signal that the Defendant intended to make a left 
turn. 
You say he did not give enough of a signal 
for the car in back to see it. You say that did not 
cause the accident. · 
On the contributory negligence you say the 
Plaintiff was negligent in failing to see a signal. 
You say before, he did not give a signal could 
be seen, so that he could not be negligent in failing 
to see one that could not be seen. 
Do you see the inconsistency 1" 
The Court then instructed the jury to agam retire 
for further deliberations. 
The Defendant excepted to the Court's action in 
ordering further deliberation on the grounds that the 
verdict as returned was not contradictory. 
After further lengthy deliberation8 the Jury agam 
returned to the Courtroom with answers to the Special 
Interrogatories, as indicated on Y erdict No. 2, Addendum 
to this Brief. Again, this verdict, as returned by the 
jury resulted in a verdict of No Cause for Action for 
the Defendant. 
The Court then polled the jury during which there 
was considerable confusion evidenced by the individual 
jurors, but at the conclusion of said questioning, judg-
ment was entered for the Plaintiff in the amounts re-
turned by tlw jun~ in Y Prdict No. 2. 
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ARUUMEN'11 
POINT ONE 
THE ORIGINAL VERDICT, AND THE VERDICT AS 
IT NOW STANDS, ENTITLES DEFENDANT TO A 
JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE FOR ACTION. 
11he original jury verdict vms clearly for the Defen-
dau.t. The "corrected'' verdict again was in favor of the 
Defendant. Yet, the Court has entered judgment for the 
Plaintiff. 
'rhe answers which the Honorable Lower Court 
found inconsistent were to Propositions Numbers 2 and 
+; that is ( 2), Defendant did not give an adequate signal, 
and ( 4), Plaintiff was contributorily negligent "in failing 
to keep a proper lookout for a signal or indicatio·n that 
the Defendant was intending to turn to the left". 
These answers are not inconsistent, inasmuch as the 
Defendant had testified, which the jury had a right to 
believe, that for one-quarter of a mile he had gradually 
slowed the speed of his vehicle from 35 miles per hour 
to what the Plaintiff admitted ~was "moving very slowly". 
This was in a GO mile per hour zone with private roads 
leading to pastures and farmlands on either side, all of 
which the Plaintiff admitted. 
Certainly the jury had a right to find that the Plain-
tiff, as a reasonable and prudent motorist, should have 
reali1wd that the vehide ahead was slowing for some 
purpo1'(' and that lw should not he p<>rmitted to simply 
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assume, under tl10se facts, that the Ddendant intended 
to proceed straight ahead. 
Furthermore, the jury found that the Defendant's 
negligence in failing to signal was not a proximate cause 
of the accident, which they had a right to find, inasmuch 
as it was admitted that the Plaintiff, who estimated his 
own speed at 35 to 40 miles per hour, left 81 feet of skid 
marks before impact, which, with the addition of the 
distance traveled during reaction time, mdicates that at 
the time he observed danger, his vehicle was 120-125 feet 
behind Defendant. This is a very few feet from the dis-
tance required to completely stop. The actual impact, 
however, was so severe as to cause the Defendant's ve-
hicle to spin in a 180 degree turn. 
In addition, the Defendant testified that at the mo-
ment of impact the Defendant's vehicle was 1wt blocking 
the southbound lane of travel, which Plaintiff had been 
occupying, and there \Vas ample room to pass to the rear 
of the Defendant. For the above reasons the jury had 
every right to find that even though they believed the 
Defendant did not give an adequate signal, that was not 
the proximate cause of the accident. 
The intent of the jury to find for the Defendant and 
against the Plaintiff is obvious. 
At the time they first returned with a verdict, they 
had not filled in the qitestiO'ns of Proposition No. 6, hav-
ing to do with danwges. The foreman had signed the bot-
tom of the second page. The fact is, therefore, that they 
did not assess damages because they had found the issues 
in favor of the Defendant. 
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In 89 C.n-; THIAL~, 8Pction 570, Pg. ;).±3, the rule 
1...- stated: 
"A special verdict, finding, or answer is to 
be construed as a whole, and, where there are two 
or more answers or findings, the ·Court is not 
permitted to isolate one and ignore the other, but 
they are to be construed together. Also, all the 
:-:;pecial issu0s submitted to the jury for answt'r:-: 
must lw eonsiden•d togetlH•r as a "·hole." 
8ection 571. 
"A special finding of the ,jury is binding on, 
and may not be ignored or disr<•garded by the 
Court, provided it is relevant and material to 
the issue, and is warranted by the evidence, does 
not contain an unwarranted conclusion of law and 
has not been set aside on proper grounds.'' 
Even when the jury returned with its "corrected" 
verdict, they did not correct their former finding that 
the Defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause of 
the accident. Neither the Court nor the jury corrected the 
answer, and it still remains the ans\ver in the Record. 
The Lower Court should be ordered to vacate the 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, and to enter judg-
ment for Defendant. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S QUESTIONING AND POLL-
ING OF THE JURY CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
rl~he rrrial .Judge aceused the ,jury of conflicting an-
swers to Special Interrogatories, which were not. The 
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jury was later required by the Court to vote in public, 
in violation of their right to sPen~cy. And when thP 
jury evidenced indecision and confusion, the Court did 
not order them to again retire for further deliberations. 
('l-1-122) ''rl1HE COURT: I think I should return 
the verdict to you and ask you to reconsider it. 
"You have found on Proposition No. 2 that 
the Defendant was negligent is not giving an 
adequate signal that the Dt>f endant intended to 
make a left turn. 
"You say he did not give enough of a signal 
for the car in the back to see it. You say that did 
not cause the accident. 
"On the contributory negligence you say the 
Plaintiff was negligent in failing to see a signal. 
You say before, he did not give a signal could be 
seen, so that he could not be negligent in failing 
to see one that could not be seen. 
"Do you see the inconsistency?'' 
"THE FOREMAN: 'We will consider it about 
five minutes in the jury room'." 
What the jury had actually found by their verdict 
was: 
1. The Defendant kept a proper lookout. 
2. The Defendant did not give an adequate signal. 
3. The lack of a signal ·was not a proximate cause 
of the accident. 
4. The Plaintiff was contributorily negligent for 
not keeping a proper lookout for an indication 
that Defendant intended to turn left (the grad-
ual slowing to a "very slow speed" in a 60 
milE:' per hour zone, his position in the high-
way, the presence of numerous side roads, 
etc.). 
-9 
'l 1lw Trial Court also ovt>rlooked the fact that tlw jury's 
an:-rn <'I' to No. ± was moot, in light with the ans\n'r:s to 
tlw three other Propo8itions. 
vVhen the jury Wa8 leaving the Courtroom to delib-
Prate further, and ina8much as the Foreman had signed 
the bottom of Page 2 of the verdict, the Court said to 
tlw Foreman: 
(rr-126) "Don't overlook the instruction that the 
verdict is to be signed at the end." 
Not having theretofore answered Page 3 on damages, 
and having been told to sign the bottom of page 3, the 
jury was confused by the Court's statements, and delib-
f:.•rated over an hour further, and returned with the ques-
tions on damages answered. They had also changed the 
answer to No. 4, because the Court in effect had told them 
they must. But the jury verdict, as it now stands in the 
Record, still found that the Defendant's negligence was 
not a. proximate cause of the accident. 
For the second time, the Court appeared to disbe-
lieve what he saw, and decided to poll the jury. The 
"polling", however, turned into searching inquiries on 
questions not even asked on the verdict, and with an 
insistence by the Court that if a juror showed any hesi-
tancy, he must answer in the jury box. We quote exam-
plPs; 
(T-130) "THE COURT: Now let me ask you an-
other question. Is it your opinion that the Plain-
tiff should not recover anything from the De-
fendant? 
Mr. Nell, should he or should he not'? 
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A. He should. 
Q. You have found for the Plaintiff t 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: On this Proposition 3, there an· 
six of you that have found that the failure to giv(• 
a signal \Vas a provirnate cause, but your answer 
on the verdict was that it was not a proximate 
cause, you have answered "False'' on it. 
That is inconsistent with your answer now that 
it was a proximate cause. 
(Yet the jury was not ordered to again retire.) 
THE FOREMAN: The questions are confusing 
back and forth. Maybe people used to it, it is clear, 
but to us it was not. 
THE COURT: Your opinion now, Mr. Nell, i~ 
that the lead automobile did not give adequate 
signal and that was a proximate cause of the 
collision? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is your decision'! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Nell, you are of the opm10n that the 
Plaintiff, the rear automobile driver, was 
contributorily negligent in failing to keep a 
proper lookout for the signal or some indica-
tion to turn - was the Plaintiff partly the 
cause of that collision? 
A. We marked that over, he had to be - no, he 
wouldn't be. 
Q. You think the Plaintiff was not contributorily 
negligent f 
A. Yes. 
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(~. 
...\. 
Q. 
A. 
\Vas lw contrilmto1·iJ~· nPglign1t, or \\·a;-;n't lw ! 
He was not contribntorial"\· ne(rliirPnt .J b b . 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
l\rr. Childs, 1vas he contributorily rn'gligPnt? 
i\o, we voted that. I eorne to tlw dPci~ion lw 
was not. 
MRS. MOSS'! 
No, he was not. 
MRS. BLACK! 
I don't knoil'. 
l\1RS . .MICKEL was the automobile follo\\·ing, 
contributorily negligent in failing to kt'ep a 
prnper lookout? 
A. I would say, yt>s, to a certain extent. 
Q. MR,. KENNER f 
A. Yes. 
MR. MOSS: I don't uelieve Mr. Kenner 1tnder-
stood. 
THE COURT: Was the Plaintiff automobile, the 
one coming up from the back, contributorily neg-
ligent by failing to kePp a proper lookout to see 
if there was a signal fo rn left turn or any indi-
cation from it that it was going to turn to the left 1 
A. 1 think he did. I think so. I think he did. 
Q. That he was negligent? 
A. No, that he was not. 
Q. That he was not~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. This back automobile, was he contributorily 
negligent, or not - the driver of it? 
A. l don't think so. 
Q. l\lR. HAFEN t 
A. Yes. 
Q. MR. ANDERSON·~ 
1:2 
A. He was not. 
Q. l\IRS. BLACK, hace you nuu.le up your mi11d 
011' it? 
A. He was not. 
Q. I will ask you again, \\·as the Plaintiff, thP 
back car, contributorily negligent in that Jw 
attempted to pass "-hen the Defondant-\Yhat 
an ordinary prudent man would have seen 
it was not safe to do so? 
A. If he tried to pass when obviously it was not 
safe to do so, he would be negligent. 
Q. In that respect was he negligent, MR. NELL! 
A. No, I don't think he was. etc. 
In Cornia vs. Albertson's, 16 Utah 2d 145, 397 P2d 
67, this Court stated: 
"In the instant case the jury was brought into 
open court and . . . conducted their voting and 
exposed their individual answers .... " 
The opinion then quotes with approval the following 
language from Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Ftah 2d 268, 3-±2 
P2d 884: 
" ... after the juror have retired to deliberate, 
their privacy in sacrosanct. It is their exclusive 
prerogative to determine the facts in their delib-
erations. For this purpose the privacy of the 
jury room should be preserved from influencP 
from outside sources or any semblance there-
of ... " 
Rule 49 (b) U.C.A., 1953 states: 
"vVhen the answers are inconsistent with each 
other . . . the Court shall not direct the entry of 
judgment but may return the jury for further 
considt'ration of its ::rnswers and vt>rdid or may 
order a new trial.'' 
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( 'l(•arJ~- tlu• Trial Court, if it l°<'lt that tlw ~<'('ond 
nrdid \rm; ineonsist<>nt \\·as lirnit('d to ordPri1w th(' 1·1uY 
b • . 
to again r<>tin·, or to order a new trial. It had no right 
to <frmand that tht> jury vot<' in puhlic individually, and 
\\·i\11out th<' rig-ht to e<mfrr \\·ith <>aeh otlu•r in ~Perecy, 
in an d'fort to eorrect th<• alh•ged inconsisten('y. ~et> 71 
.\LH 2d G63. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONSTITUTED RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR. 
'!'lw Court's Instruction No. 9-J stated: 
''There is no duty on the driver of an auto-
mobile to sound the horn upon his intPnding to 
pass another vehicle." 
At rr-118, the Defendant excepted to the Court's 
refusal to instruct with relation to the statutory require-
111ents of -H-6-55 (b) and ±1-G-146, as well as this De-
fendant'R Re q u l-' st e d Instructions (R-17) concerning 
sounding of the horn. 
-U-6-1-Hi, Utah Cod<~ Annotated, provides: 
" (a) Every motor vehicle when operating 
upon a highway shall be equipped with a horn in 
good working ordPr ... the driver of a motor 
vehicle shall, when reasonably necessary to insure 
safo operation, give audible warning with his 
horn, but shall not otherwise nse such horn when 
npon a highway." 
-t 1-Ci-f1:l ( h) states : 
"Except when overtaking and passing on the 
rig-lit is iwrmitted, tlw drin·r of an overtaken 
vPhitle shall o·ivP \\"CW to the rii.d1t in favor of the 
h • " 
ovPrtaking vPhi<'lt• on amlihl<• ~ip;nal ... '' 
1·1 
Under the above instruction of the Honorable Comt, 
the jury was advised that under no circumstances would 
the Plaintiff he required to sound his horn. 
In 111 anning 1·s. Pou;ers, 117 l 'tah :no, 215 P2d 396, 
this Court stated: 
"The Court, by Instruction No. 10, in effect 
instructed that the driver of a vehicle intending-
to pass another vehicle does not, under all cir-
cumstances, owe the duty of sounding his horn, 
but rather that the sounding of the horn is left 
to the judgment of the operator in the exereisP 
of due care. vV e see no error in the Instruction. 
It comports with Sec. 27-7-206, subsection (a), 
lLC.A. 1943, wherein it is provided: 
'* * * The driver of a motor vehicle shall when 
reasonably necessary to insure safe operation give 
audible warning with his horn but shall not other-
wise use such horn when upon a highway'." 
"True, in Sec. 57-7-122, subsection (b) U.C.A. 
l 943, it is provided that the driver of a vehicle 
overtaken on the highway by another shall givr 
way to the overtaking vehicle on audible signal. 
Since the Court below gave an instruction based 
upon that status, appellant contends that the two 
instructions on the sounding of a horn are incon-
sistent. \Ve do not so construe them, nor do we 
believe that the jury could be misled thereby. The 
instructions in question dealt with different fact 
situations." 
In N aislJitt 'i·s. Eggett, 5 Utah 2d 5, 295 P2d 832, 
at 834, the Court states: 
''Plaintiff further cites as negligence, the 
failure of Defendant to give "·a1ning of his HJJ-
15 
proach to tlw inkrscdion, l'.C.A. Hl53, -l-1-(i-1-!G 
provides that, 'The driver of a motor vehicle shall 
wlwn n·asonahly nPeessary to insun· safo 01wra-
tion gin' audible warning \rith his horn hut shall 
not otlwn\'ise use such horn wlwn upon a high-
"·a.'··' rl'his sPction has bet'n intPqJJ"eted as not 
pla('inp; a duty upon a driver to :-;ournl hi:-; horn 
in an.'· particular traffic situation, lmt instead to 
require due carr i11 tlic exercise nf j11dg111e1it as 
lo 11·hrt71er s11ch 1n1rning is 11crrs,ary. Jlanni11g P'. 
Powers, 117 Ftah 310, :215 P2d ::39(i'." 
'Failure to give a u·unzi11g sig11al does not 
co11stit11te 11e,r7lf.(;encc ithen there is no apparent 
necessity for such (/. iutrnin,q. Nelso11 vs. Lott, 81 
Utah 2G5, 17 P2d 272.' 
In the case at Bar, there was a jury question as to 
whether the Plaintiff, in not sounding his horn under 
the circumstances "exercised due care in the exercise of 
judgrnPnt" in not sounding his horn. 
rrhis accident occurred in a GO mile per hour zone; 
the Defendant, while Plaintiff was coming up from the 
rear, had slowed from :15 miles per hour ( T-105) to what 
the Plaintiff admitted was a "very slow" speed .(T-79) 
The area was farm and pasture hmd with many 
private roads leading from the highway. ( T-7) The 
Defendant was driving an old pick-up truck, obviously 
a farm vehicle. 
Certainly the jury had a right to find that Plaintiff 
was negligent for not sounding his horn in anticipation 
that the "verY slowly movino- YPhidP" intPrnled to change • . 0 
itl' eonrf:<' of travel. 
lt) 
In fact, the jury in their first verdict, found that 
Plaintiff was negligent for not keeping a proper lookout 
for "an indication" that Defendant intended to turn left. 
The Court's refusal to properly instruct the jury, 
and to leave the question of fact to the jury's decision on 
whether the Plaintiff was negligent in not sounding his 
horn under the circumstances, constituted reversible 
error. 
SUMMARY 
The original jury verdict was m favor of the De-
fendant. 
The Court ruled there was an inconsistency which 
did not exist. Even so, the "corrected" verdict was again 
in favor of the Defendant. Again, the Court ruled there 
was an inconsistency, but did not again order the jury 
to retire, but insisted each juror vote in Open Court. All 
of the errors were against the Defendant, not the Plain-
tiff. A judgment should be ordered based on the jury 
verdict, or in lieu thereof, a new trial should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. l!J . .t\llDGLEY 
-H5 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADD1£NDL;_M 
Vl£RD1Crr NO. l n'-122) 
Prnpo:::;ition No. 1. 'l'he Defendant was 
lll'gligPnt in failing to keep a proper and :::;uf-
fi<'it>nt lookout for car:::; approaching from the 
rear. ·•False·' 
Proposition No. 2. The Defendant was neg-
ligent in not giving an adequate signal of tlw 
DPfendant':::; intention to turn to the left. ''True" 
('l'-U Proposition No. 3 had not been an-
:-;\n'rPcl and the Court handed the verdict back 
to thP foreman who wrote in the answer, show-
ed it to the other juryrnent and the verdict was 
thPn returned to the Judge.) 
Proposition No. 3. The negligence of the 
DE>fendant that we have found on Proposition 
No. __________ or Proposition No.----------, was a prox-
imate cause of the collision. "False" 
Proposition No. 4. The Plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent in failing to keep a proper 
lookout for a signal or indication that the De-
fimdant was intending to utrn to the left. "True" 
Pro1Josition No. 5. The Plaintiff was con-
tri lrntorily negligent in attempting to pass the 
Defendant's truck when an ordinary prudent 
lllan would have seen that it ,,-as not safe to do 
w. "False'' 
Proposition N o.u. (on damages - Page 3) 
and the subparagraphs were not answered. 
'l11w verdict was signed at the bottom of 
Paw' 2 by the Foreman. 
At T-122-123 the Court advised the jury 
that tlwi r verdict was inconsistent and asked 
tlwm to again retiri>. As the jury was leaving 
th\' Courtroom the Court stated: "Don't over-
look tht> instruction that t]w verdict is to be 
"i,~nPd at the end.'' (T-12G) 
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ADDENDUM 
VERDIOT NO. 2 (T-126 et seq) 
Proposition No. 1. rrhe Defendant was neg-
ligent in failing to keep a proper and sufficient 
lookout for cars approaching from the rear. "False" 
Proposition No. 2. The Defendant was neg-
ligent in not giving an adequate signal of the 
Defendant's intention to turn to the left. "True" 
Proposition No. 3. The negligence of the 
Defendant that we have found on Proposition 
No. __________ or Proposition No. __________ was a prox-
imate of the collision. "False" 
Proposition No. 4. The Plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent in failing to keep a proper 
lookout for a signal or indication that the De-
fendant was intending to turn to the left. "False" 
Proposition No. 5. The Plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent in attempting to pass the 
Defendant's truck when an ordinary prudent 
man would have seen that is was not safe to 
do so. "False'' 
Proposition No. 6, relating to damages, 
was filled in and the verdict signed on the lines 
provided. 
After questioning the jurors at length, the 
Court entered .Judgment for Plaintiff. 
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